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囚人のジレンマゲームに関する心理実験

—「対面条件」と「仕返し戦略」の検証—

A Psychological Experiment on the Prisoners' Dilemma Game

—Verifications of the Face-to face Condition and the Tit-for-tat Strategy —

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Abstract

According to the previous research, in almost of cases the two-accomplice-statement is selected in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game. It is called the mutual poverty. But in the state that participants are acquainted with each other, the co-prosperity state become dominant. This experiment tries to compare the Face-to-face condition with the Non-face-to-face condition. Additionally in the process of experiment, it is analyzed whether the Tit for tat strategy is observed or not.