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List of Discussion Paper Series
- No.1998-04 (September 1998)
- Optimal Economic Monitoring and Enforcement of Incentive Compatible Environmental Regulation
- Hans W. Gottinger (Professor, Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University)
- Abstract:
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Optimal environmental regulations are derived in the presence of asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs. It is recognized that compliance may have to be induced through appropriate monitoring and enforcement measures.
The regulator commits to monitoring of compliance with the incentive compatible environmental regulations, and asymmetric information characterizes the interaction between the firm and regulator.
The probabilities of monitoring abatement standards, and corresponding subsidies are optimally chosen to ensure firm compliance. Enforcement considerations are shown to distort downward the pollution abatement requirements mandated for firms.
- Keywords:
- Environmental Regulation, Asymmetric Information, Incentive Compatibility, Monitoring